Perhaps, mind and brain are identical {psychophysical identity} {mind-brain identity theory}. The same property can be both mental and physical. They are like two names for same thing. In the possibility argument, philosophical zombies cannot exist, because they must have the mental state if they have the brain state. However, brain-state and mental-state identity has no plausible mechanism or meaningful connection (McGinn) (Nagel).
language
They only seem different, because different language is for objective and subjective descriptions. Mind and brain can unify by relating both descriptions.
substance
Perhaps, brain and mind share third substance or property, to provide underlying unity. For example, signals entering, or inside, brain can be sense data that can combine into physical objects or into mental objects. Alternatively, physical objects can have mental essences.
existence
People can imagine that no physical world exists, and the physical world is only sense qualities in the mental world. People can imagine that no mental world exists, and the mental world can be disposition to perform certain behaviors in certain circumstances.
mental state
The mental world can be physical mind state, making physical mind.
mental unity
Objects can have minds. Objects can be in one mind.
Perhaps, mental states correspond to neural states {central-state identity}.
Perhaps, mental states are factually identical with brain states but do not have to be logically identical {mind-brain correspondence}.
Perhaps, sense qualities are objective non-relational physical-object properties or are the same as brain electrochemical, biophysical, and relational events {physicalism, mind} [Baker, 1987].
Perhaps, particular mental states, such as pain, are identical to particular brain states, such as nerve firing, but they are not necessarily identical in general {token-identity theory, monism} {token-identity thesis} {token physicalism}. Because mental events can have different neural pathways, they can be instances, not types. Mental events have physical events. Mental states include beliefs and pains.
Perhaps, neural states are state types that only brains can have {type-identity theory, monism} {type-identity thesis} {identity theory} {type physicalism}. Mental states, such as pain in general, and brain states, such as nerve fiber firing, are identical in type but are not necessarily identical in particular instances. Mental variables have physical variables.
6-Philosophy-Mind-Theories-Monism
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Date Modified: 2022.0225