Perhaps, phenomenal properties are representational properties {representationalism}.
causes: stimulation
Stimuli make sense-data. Perception sense-data, ideas, and impression are mental internal representations. Representations are mental states and are like phenomena.
causes: intention
Alternatively, people need no stimuli, only intentional statements. Intentions and representations are about external things or possible external things. Intentions can make representations but are not mental states. Representations are not like phenomena but are coded information.
representation: similarity
Something can represent something else by being similar to it. Similarity is reciprocal. However, real representations have only one direction. Similarity can be more or less. Similarity relations need similarity-level information.
representation: covariance
Something can represent something else by being caused to co-vary by second thing. Covariance is reciprocal. However, real representations have only one direction. Covariance has strength. Covariance relations need causation-strength information.
representation: function
Something can represent something else using representational functions. Such representation requires indicating function and strength. Systems have basic representational functions {systemic representation} that can change to create new representations {acquired representation}. Natural representations evolve.
representation: function and evolution
Something can represent something else, because evolution shaped it to do so. Such representation requires evolutionary benefits and selection strengths.
phenomena
Perhaps, representations completely specify conscious phenomena {exhaustion thesis}. Perhaps, representations need other mental attributes.
phenomena: external or internal
Conscious phenomena appear in environment {externalism, phenomena}. Conscious phenomena are in mind {internalism, phenomena}. If consciousness is a mental state, representations can project {projectivism, phenomena} onto external surfaces {literal projectivism} or seem to do so {figurative projectivism}.
phenomena: higher order
Perhaps, representational mental states can be "perceived" by higher-level mental abilities {representational theory, representationalism} {higher-order perception}. Consciousness links perceptions, in occipital lobe, to concepts, emotions, plans, memories, and values, in frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes.
phenomena: consciousness
Perhaps, consciousness is natural representations. However, some conscious states have no perception [Dretske, 1988] [Dretske, 1995].
Social Sciences>Philosophy>Mind>Theories>Functionalism
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Date Modified: 2022.0224